

Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic

Essay 3: Numbers as objects and the Caesar problem

Readings:

- (!) Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, §55-69.
- (!) Kenny, A., *Frege* (Blackwell, 2000), pp. 78-99
- Benacerraf, P., 'What Numbers Could not Be', *Philosophical Review* 74 (1965): 47-73
- Hale, B., 'Frege's Platonism', *Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1984): 225-241.
- Hale, B. & Wright, C., 'To Bury Caesar...' in Hale & Wright, *The Reason's Proper Study* (OUP, 2001).
- Heck, R., 'The Julius Caesar Problem,' in his (ed.), *Language, Thought, and Logic* (Oxford UP, 1997).

Essay questions:

Which definitions of numbers as objects does Frege consider, and which does he eventually accept? What is the Julius Caesar objection, and is it equally worrying (if worrying at all) to all of the proposed definitions? Should we ultimately accept Frege's claim that numbers are self-subsistent objects?